The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli
A timeless guide to power, political strategy, and the realities of leadership in an unpredictable world.
Dedication
Most of the time, those who wish to gain favor with a ruler present themselves to him with the things they value most or believe will please him the most. That’s why we often see people give princes horses, weapons, gold cloth, precious stones, and similar gifts that suit their status.
Wanting to show my respect for Your Magnificence with some token of my service, I have not found among my belongings anything I value or cherish more than my knowledge of the deeds of great men—knowledge gained through long experience with contemporary affairs and constant study of the ancient ones. After carefully reflecting on and examining these matters, I have condensed them into a small volume, which I now send to Your Magnificence.
Although I believe this work is unworthy of being presented to you, I trust that your kindness will lead you to accept it, especially since I cannot offer you a greater gift than the opportunity to quickly understand, in a short time, what I have learned over so many years and through so many hardships and dangers. I have not filled this work with elaborate phrases or grand or flowery language, or with any external embellishments, which many use to decorate their writings. Instead, I want nothing to honor it except the truth of the subject matter and the importance of the topic.
I do not want it to be seen as arrogance if a man of low and humble position dares to discuss and set forth the rules of government for princes. Just as those who draw maps place themselves on lower ground to study the nature of mountains and high places, and climb mountains to get a better view of the plains, so too, to understand the nature of the people, one must be a prince, and to understand princes, one must be of the people.
Therefore, I hope Your Magnificence will accept this small gift in the spirit in which I send it. If you read and consider it carefully, you will see in it my deep desire for you to reach the greatness that fortune and your qualities promise you. And if, from your height, you occasionally look down to these humble places, you will realize how unjustly I endure a constant and severe misfortune.
Chapter I
The Different Types of Principalities and How They Are Acquired
All states, all powers that rule over people, are either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, where the ruling family has been in power for generations, or new. New principalities can be entirely new, like Milan was to Francesco Sforza, or they can be added to the hereditary lands of the ruler, like the Kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain.
These new territories are either used to living under a prince, or they are accustomed to being free. They are acquired either with the arms of others or with one’s own arms, and either by luck or by ability.
Chapter II
Hereditary Principalities
I will set aside discussion of republics, since I have written about them in detail elsewhere. Here, I will focus only on principalities, and, following the outline above, I will discuss how they can be governed and maintained.
In hereditary states—those used to being ruled by a particular family—it is much easier to maintain power than in new principalities. The main requirement is not to change the established order set by one’s ancestors, and to adapt sensibly to changing circumstances. If a hereditary prince is reasonably competent, he will keep his position—unless a truly extraordinary and overwhelming force takes it away, and even then, if he loses it, he is likely to regain it.
For example, in Italy, the Duke of Ferrara was able to withstand attacks from the Venetians in 1484 and from Pope Julius II in 1510 for no other reason than that he was well established in his domain.
A hereditary ruler has fewer reasons and less need to offend his people, so he is usually more loved. Unless some exceptional vice makes him hated, it is natural for his subjects to be loyal. The long-standing nature of the ruling family’s power erases memories and reasons for revolution, because every change leaves the groundwork for another change to follow.
Chapter III
Mixed Principalities
The real difficulties arise in new principalities. If the new territory is not entirely new, but rather added to an existing state, it is called a “mixed principality.” Problems arise here for two main reasons. First, people are always quick to change rulers, believing the change will improve their lives. This hope leads them to take up arms against their ruler, but they soon find through experience that things have gotten worse. This is natural because, when a new prince takes over, he is forced to offend those who helped him gain power and cannot satisfy their expectations. At the same time, he must rely on his own military and commit many acts that upset the population. So, the new prince finds himself surrounded by enemies he has harmed, and supporters who quickly become dissatisfied because he cannot meet their expectations.
For example, King Louis XII of France conquered Milan easily, but lost it just as quickly because the people who helped him in had unrealistic expectations. Disappointed, they turned against him. When a prince retakes a rebellious territory, it is harder to lose it again, because after a rebellion, the prince can be more forceful—punishing traitors, strengthening his position, and guarding weak points. Thus, while the first time Louis lost Milan because of a single powerful enemy, the next time, it took the combined force of almost all of Europe to drive him out.
When a prince acquires new states, they are either from the same region and language as his old state, or they are different. If they are similar, it is much easier to hold them—especially if the people are used to being ruled by a prince. To secure such a state, you only need to eliminate the former ruling family and leave everything else unchanged. This is why places like Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy have remained loyal to France for so long.
However, when you acquire a state in a region with a different language, culture, and laws, it becomes much harder to hold. In these cases, the best solution is for the new prince to move there and live among his new subjects. This allows the prince to quickly spot and address problems, prevents officials from exploiting the people, and helps him win loyalty or inspire fear when necessary. It also deters foreign threats.
Another effective method is to establish colonies in key locations, which are inexpensive and create only a small number of enemies—those who lose their land. The rest of the population, left unharmed, will remain quiet, and those displaced are too weak to retaliate. On the other hand, stationing a large garrison is expensive and creates widespread resentment, making the whole population your enemy.
In regions that are culturally different, a prince should support weaker neighboring states, weaken stronger ones, and prevent any powerful outsider from gaining influence. Discontented locals will often invite powerful foreigners, as the Greeks once invited the Romans. When a strong foreigner comes in, the weaker local powers easily side with him out of envy for the stronger local powers. The new ruler must be careful not to let allies become too strong, using their support to keep the most powerful in check and remain in control.
The Romans managed their provinces skillfully: they established colonies, supported weaker powers without letting them grow too strong, weakened the strong, and kept powerful outsiders out. They anticipated future problems and dealt with them early, fighting wars in Greece rather than waiting for them to come to Italy. Smart rulers act not just for immediate problems, but also guard against future ones.
Returning to France, King Louis XII made several mistakes in Italy. He empowered the Church, weakened his allies, brought in a powerful foreigner (Spain), did not move to Italy himself, and failed to establish colonies. These mistakes, especially taking Venice’s lands, allowed Spain to gain a foothold and ultimately led to France losing Italy.
From this, we learn a general rule: if you help someone else become powerful, you put yourself at risk because their rise is due to your actions, and they may see you as a threat.
Chapter IV
Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against His Successors
Given the difficulties in holding newly acquired states, one might wonder how Alexander the Great was able to conquer the vast kingdom of Asia so quickly, and why—after his sudden death—the entire state did not revolt. In fact, his successors held onto it, facing only internal struggles among themselves.
This can be explained by looking at two main ways principalities are governed:
By a single ruler with everyone else as servants (who help govern by the ruler’s favor and permission)
By a ruler alongside powerful barons or nobles (who hold their positions by hereditary right and have their own lands and loyal subjects)
In states where everyone serves at the ruler’s pleasure (like the Turkish Empire), the ruler has absolute authority; no one is recognized above him, and all others are only officials, not truly loved by the people. In states with powerful nobles (like France), these barons have their own followers and are loved by their people.
If you look at the Turkish Empire, it is hard to conquer but easy to hold once you have defeated it. This is because the ruler’s officials are loyal only to him, and it’s difficult to corrupt or win them over. If you do defeat the ruler and eliminate his family, there is no one left with enough influence to rally the people against you.
With a kingdom like France, it is easier to conquer, because you can win over some discontented nobles who will help you gain entry. But after victory, keeping control is much harder, because the nobles still have their own power and can easily lead revolts. Even if you eliminate the royal family, these nobles remain a constant threat.
Now, the kingdom of Darius was governed like the Turkish Empire: a single ruler with dependent officials. That’s why Alexander had to defeat Darius completely in battle. Once Darius was dead, the state became secure under Alexander, because there were no local nobles with enough authority to challenge him. Any unrest that followed was due only to the ambitions of Alexander’s own men.
In contrast, in countries with powerful local lords—like Spain, France, and Greece—the Romans faced frequent rebellions. Only when the memory and influence of those lords faded over time did the Romans truly secure their control.
So, it should not be surprising that Alexander was able to hold Asia so easily, while others—like Pyrrhus and many more—struggled to keep their conquests. The difference lies not in the conqueror’s skill or virtue, but in the nature of the state itself.
Chapter V
How to Govern Cities or Principalities That Previously Lived by Their Own Laws
When you acquire states that are used to living with their own laws and in freedom, there are three ways to keep control over them:
Destroy them completely.
Move there and live in person.
Allow them to keep their own laws, but collect tribute and set up a small loyal government to keep the city friendly to you. This government knows its survival depends on your support, so it will do everything to maintain your power.
It is often easier to hold a formerly free city by using its own citizens, rather than by force.
For example, the Spartans tried to control Athens and Thebes by creating small ruling groups, but eventually lost both cities. The Romans, on the other hand, destroyed Capua, Carthage, and Numantia—and never lost them. When the Romans tried to rule Greece by letting it remain free with its own laws, it did not work, and they ended up destroying many Greek cities to keep control. In truth, the only sure way to hold a city used to freedom is to destroy it.
If you become the ruler of a free city and do not destroy it, you can expect it will eventually overthrow you. The memory and desire for freedom can never be erased, no matter how much time passes or how many benefits you offer. The people will always remember their old ways and will seize any opportunity to rebel, as Pisa did many years after being conquered by Florence.
However, when cities or provinces are used to being ruled by a prince and that royal family is gone, they are more easily controlled. They are accustomed to obedience, and without their old rulers, they don’t know how to rule themselves. They are slower to rebel and easier for a new prince to secure and control.
But in republics, the love of liberty and hatred for conquerors is always stronger. The only safe ways to control such cities are to destroy them or to live there yourself.
Chapter VI
New Principalities Acquired by One’s Own Arms and Ability
When discussing entirely new principalities and new rulers, I will give great examples. This is because people usually follow paths already taken by others and try to imitate those who came before them, though they can never exactly follow old ways or equal the abilities of those they imitate. A wise person should aim high, like a skilled archer aiming above the target, so that even if their reach is limited, they still come closer to success.
In completely new principalities with a new ruler, the difficulty of maintaining power depends on how capable the ruler is. Becoming a prince from a private citizen generally requires either ability (virtù) or luck (fortuna), but those who rely more on their own abilities tend to keep power more securely.
Among the best examples of founders who became rulers through their own ability are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus. Even though Moses was guided by God, he is still admirable for being worthy of such guidance. Looking at Cyrus and others who founded kingdoms, you’ll find that fortune only gave them opportunity; their abilities allowed them to make use of it. Without opportunity, their abilities would have been wasted, and without ability, opportunity would have meant nothing. For example:
Moses found the Israelites enslaved in Egypt and ready to follow him out.
Romulus had to leave Alba and become king of Rome.
Cyrus found the Persians unhappy under the Medes, who had grown weak.
Theseus could only show his worth because the Athenians were divided.
These opportunities made these men successful, but it was their ability that let them seize the moment and bring greatness to their people.
Those who become rulers by ability face difficulties in gaining power but find it easier to hold onto it. The main challenge comes from having to introduce new systems and reforms for the sake of security and stability. Nothing is more difficult, uncertain, or dangerous than creating new laws and institutions. The reformer has enemies among those who benefited from the old order, and only lukewarm support from those who might benefit from the new.
People often don’t really believe in new things until they see real evidence. So, whenever enemies have a chance to attack, they do so enthusiastically, while supporters defend only halfheartedly, putting the reformer at risk.
It is important to ask whether these reformers depend on themselves or on others. If they rely on their own strength and can use force, their chances are better. That’s why armed prophets succeed, while unarmed prophets fail. People are fickle: it’s easy to persuade them, but hard to keep them convinced. Therefore, a new ruler must be ready to use force when persuasion fails.
Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have been able to hold power for long if they had not been armed. In modern times, we saw this with Savonarola in Florence: once people stopped believing in him, he fell quickly because he had no way to enforce his authority.
These rulers face great difficulties at first, but once they overcome them and eliminate those who envy or oppose them, they become powerful, secure, respected, and successful.
Let me add a smaller example: Hieronymus of Syracuse. He rose from private citizen to ruler not by luck, but by taking advantage of an opportunity when his people were oppressed. He reorganized the military, got rid of the old guard, and built a solid foundation of support. He struggled to gain power, but once he had it, he kept it with little trouble.
Chapter VII
New Principalities Acquired Through the Arms and Fortune of Others
Those who become princes purely by luck—such as being given power by someone else or through money—gain their positions easily, but have a hard time keeping them. They face few challenges on their way to power because their rise is sudden, but all the real difficulties come after they are in power.
These are people who are granted states by others, like those in ancient Greece appointed by Darius, or Roman emperors made by the army’s favor. Their success depends on the will and fortune of those who helped them, which are always unpredictable. They lack the experience to rule, and they don’t have truly loyal followers.
States that come into being suddenly, like anything in nature that grows quickly, rarely grow strong roots and are easily swept away by the first storm—unless the new ruler is very capable and quickly learns to build the foundations for lasting power.
To illustrate the difference between rulers who rise by ability and those who rise by fortune, Machiavelli gives two examples from his own time: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia (Duke Valentino). Sforza became Duke of Milan through his own skill and kept it with little trouble after overcoming great challenges. Borgia, on the other hand, became powerful only because of his father’s influence (Pope Alexander VI) and lost everything when that support disappeared, despite his efforts to secure his position.
Borgia’s story is a lesson for all new princes who gain power through luck and the arms of others. He faced many obstacles—Italy’s political divisions, local rivalries, and the need to build a power base independent of his father’s fortune. Borgia worked hard to eliminate rival powers, win over nobles, and strengthen his own army. He was ruthless when needed, such as when he used Ramiro d’Orco to impose order in Romagna and then had him killed publicly to win over the people’s trust.
Borgia also tried to secure his future by eliminating the families of dispossessed rulers, winning over Rome’s nobility, controlling the College of Cardinals, and aiming to acquire enough territory to stand on his own. Unfortunately, his plans were cut short by the sudden death of his father and his own illness, leaving him exposed to enemies on all sides.
Machiavelli concludes that Borgia did everything right—he moved quickly, used both force and cunning, made himself loved and feared, built a loyal army, eliminated threats, and sought powerful alliances. The only mistake he made was allowing Pope Julius II to be elected, a man who had reason to fear and oppose him.
Lesson: Anyone who rises to power through luck or the arms of others should follow Borgia’s example: eliminate enemies, win over friends, use both force and cunning, secure the loyalty of soldiers, and avoid leaving future threats in place. Never trust that new favors will erase old grudges.
Chapter VIII
On Those Who Achieve Principalities Through Wicked Deeds
Since it is possible for a private individual to become a prince in two additional ways—which cannot be entirely credited to either fortune or ability—I do not think it right to leave them out, even though one of them can be discussed at greater length in a section on republics. These cases are when someone ascends to the principate through some criminal or wicked path, or when a private citizen becomes prince of his homeland with the support of his fellow citizens. Speaking of the first method, I will provide two examples, one ancient and one modern, without going further into the merits of this method since I believe these cases are enough for anyone forced to imitate them.
Agathocles the Sicilian, not only emerged from private, but from the lowest and most miserable origins, to become King of Syracuse. He was the son of a potter and led a wicked life at every stage of his fortune. Nonetheless, he combined his crimes with such strength of mind and body that, turning to a military career, he rose through its ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. Once in that position, having decided to become prince—and to hold by violence and without obligation to others what had been granted him by agreement—and having shared his plans with Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who was at that time leading armies in Sicily, he gathered the people and Senate of Syracuse one morning, as if to discuss matters relevant to the republic. At a planned signal, he had his soldiers kill all the senators and the richest citizens. After they were dead, he seized and held the principate of the city without any civil opposition. Although he was twice defeated by the Carthaginians and eventually besieged, not only was he able to defend his city, but, leaving part of his forces for its defense, he attacked Africa with the rest, and in a short time freed Syracuse from the siege and drove the Carthaginians to such dire straits that they had to make peace with him, accepting possession of Africa and leaving Sicily to Agathocles.
Anyone considering Agathocles’s actions and abilities would find few, if any, that should be attributed to fortune; as mentioned above, he did not gain the principate through the favor of others, but through military ranks he had won by enduring countless hardships and dangers, and afterwards kept it through daring and dangerous actions. Still, one cannot call it virtue to kill one’s fellow citizens, betray friends, have no faith, no pity, no religion—such methods can win power, but not glory. If you look at Agathocles’s courage in facing and overcoming dangers, and his greatness of spirit in enduring adversity, there’s no reason to consider him inferior to the greatest commanders. Nevertheless, his extreme cruelty and inhumanity, with countless crimes, prevent him from being celebrated among the greatest men.
Thus, what he accomplished cannot be attributed to fortune or virtue, since he achieved it without either. In our times, under Pope Alexander VI, Oliverotto of Fermo, who was left an orphan years before, was raised by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani. In his youth, he was sent to serve as a soldier under Paolo Vitelli, so that with discipline he might reach high military rank. After Paolo died, Oliverotto served under Vitellozzo, Paolo’s brother, and quickly became one of the top men in his force, being clever, strong in body and mind. But, feeling it servile to serve others, he decided, with the help of some citizens of Fermo—who preferred servitude to the freedom of their homeland—and with Vitellozzo’s support, to seize Fermo. He wrote to Giovanni Fogliani, saying that after being away for years, he wanted to come see him and his city, and to inspect his inheritance. He claimed he had worked hard only to win honor, so that his fellow citizens could see he hadn’t wasted his time, wishing to return honorably and accompanied by a hundred horsemen who were his friends and servants. He asked his uncle to arrange for the people of Fermo to receive him with honor, which would bring respect to both Oliverotto and his uncle, since he was his ward.
Giovanni carried out all the proper courtesies for his nephew, arranged a respectful reception by the people of Fermo, and had Oliverotto stay at his home. After some days spent organizing all that was necessary for his wicked plan, Oliverotto held a grand banquet, inviting Giovanni and all the leading citizens of Fermo. After the meal and the usual entertainments, Oliverotto steered the conversation to serious matters, speaking about the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and their enterprises. As Giovanni and the others responded, Oliverotto suddenly stood up, saying those subjects were best discussed in private, and moved to another room, followed by Giovanni and the other citizens. No sooner were they seated than soldiers hidden in the chamber emerged and killed Giovanni and all the others. After this murder, Oliverotto mounted his horse, rode through the city, and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that out of fear, he was forced to obey and establish a government, with Oliverotto as its prince. With all those who might oppose him dead, he strengthened his rule with new civil and military orders, so that in the year he held power, he was secure in Fermo and became feared by all his neighbors. His position would have been as hard to overthrow as Agathocles’s, if he hadn’t let himself be tricked by Cesare Borgia, who, as mentioned above, captured the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, and there Oliverotto, a year after his parricide, was strangled alongside Vitellozzo, who had been his teacher in both valor and wickedness.
Someone might wonder how Agathocles and others like him, after countless treacheries and cruelties, could live long and safely in their homelands, defend themselves from external enemies, and never face conspiracies from their own citizens, when many others, even in peaceful times, have lost their states through cruelty, let alone during war. I believe this is due to the difference between cruelty well-used and badly-used. Well-used cruelty (if it is ever possible to call evil good) is that which is done all at once, out of necessity for securing oneself, and is not continued, but is then turned to the greatest benefit for the subjects possible. Badly-used cruelty is, even if few at first, those that grow with time rather than diminish. Those who follow the first path can, with God and man, find some remedy for their rule, as Agathocles did. For the others, it is impossible to maintain power.
Therefore, it must be noted that when seizing a state, a conqueror should consider and carry out all necessary acts of cruelty at once, so as not to have to return to them daily, and so he can reassure people and win them over with benefits that follow. Anyone who does otherwise, out of timidity or bad advice, will be forced to keep a knife in hand and can never rely on his subjects, who, unable to trust a ruler who constantly injures them, will never be loyal. Injuries must be inflicted all at once, so that they are less tasted and, therefore, less resented. Benefits should be given gradually, so that they are better appreciated. Above all, a prince should live with his subjects in such a way that no sudden event, good or bad, will cause him to change course. If, in hard times, you need to resort to violence, it’s too late; and if you offer good deeds then, people see them as forced, and you gain no gratitude.
Chapter IX
On the Civil Principality
Now, turning to the other case—a citizen becomes prince of his homeland, not through wickedness or intolerable violence, but with the support of his fellow citizens. This can be called a civil principality, and achieving it does not require complete virtue or complete fortune, but rather a lucky kind of cleverness. One can rise to this principality either through the favor of the people or through the favor of the powerful (the nobles).
In every city, there are these two opposing groups. The people wish not to be commanded or oppressed by the great, and the great wish to command and oppress the people. From these two different desires, one of three results arises in cities: either a principality, liberty, or license. A principality is established either by the people or by the great, depending on which group takes the initiative. When the great realize they cannot resist the people, they turn to one of their own and make him prince, so they can satisfy their ambitions under his protection. Likewise, when the people see that they cannot resist the great, they turn to a single person and make him prince, so as to be defended by his authority.
A prince who rises to power with the help of the great has a harder time maintaining his position than one who rises with the support of the people. This is because he finds himself surrounded by many who see themselves as his equals, making it difficult for him to command or manage them as he wishes. But the one who becomes prince with the favor of the people finds himself alone, with few or none around him who are not ready to obey.
Moreover, it is not possible to satisfy the great honestly and without hurting others, but it is possible to satisfy the people. The people’s desire—not to be oppressed—is more honest than that of the great, who seek to oppress. Furthermore, a prince can never fully secure himself against a hostile people, because they are too many, whereas he can secure himself against the great, who are few.
The worst a prince can expect from a people who are his enemies is to be abandoned by them. But from hostile nobles, he must fear not only being abandoned but also being actively opposed, because nobles are more perceptive and clever, always finding ways to save themselves and seeking favor with whoever they think will win.
A prince must always live with the same people, but he can do without the same nobles, since he can make and unmake them every day, granting and taking away their reputations as he pleases. To clarify, I say that nobles should be considered in two main ways: either they act so as to tie themselves completely to your fortune, or they do not. Those who commit themselves and are not greedy deserve to be honored and loved. Those who do not commit themselves fall into two categories: either they do so out of timidity and lack of spirit—in which case you can use them, especially if they are wise advisors, because in good times you gain honor from them and in hard times you have nothing to fear; or, they refrain from loyalty out of ambition, thinking more of themselves than of you. Such men must be watched as if they were open enemies, for in adversity, they will always help bring about your downfall.
Therefore, someone who becomes prince with the people’s favor must keep the people as friends, which is easy because they only want not to be oppressed. But a prince who becomes ruler against the people with the support of the nobles must first try to win over the people, which is easy if he takes up their cause. When people receive benefits from someone they once expected harm from, they are more grateful to their benefactor than if he had attained power through their support. The prince can win them over in many ways, which vary depending on the situation, so there can be no set rule for all cases, and so I will not elaborate further.
I will conclude only that it is necessary for a prince to have the support of the people, otherwise he has no remedy in times of adversity. Nabides, Prince of the Spartans, withstood the siege of all Greece and a victorious Roman army, defending his country and his state, and it was enough for him, when danger came, to secure the loyalty of a few. If he had had the people against him, that would not have sufficed.
Let no one contradict this opinion of mine with the old proverb that “he who builds on the people builds on mud,” because that is only true when a private citizen relies on the people to save him from enemies or magistrates. In that case, he may often find himself disappointed, as happened in Rome to the Gracchi and in Florence to Giorgio Scali. But when it is a prince who builds on this foundation—one who can command, is brave in adversity, has all necessary preparations, and keeps the populace inspired by his spirit and actions—he will not be disappointed and will find his foundations solid.
These principalities generally become unstable when trying to move from a civil order to an absolute one, because princes either rule directly or through magistrates. In the latter case, their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who hold magistracy, who, especially in hard times, can easily take away the prince’s power either by opposing him or by disobeying. The prince is not in a position, in times of danger, to seize absolute authority, because citizens and subjects, used to taking orders from magistrates, are not ready in such moments to obey the prince, and in critical times he will find few he can trust. This is particularly dangerous because it can only be tested once.
Thus, a wise prince should devise a way so that his citizens, always and in every circumstance, need the state and their ruler. Then, they will always be loyal to him.
Chapter X
How the Strength of All Principalities Should Be Measured
When examining the different types of principalities, there’s another consideration: whether a prince has a state strong enough to stand on its own if necessary, or whether he must always rely on the defense of others. To clarify, I say that those who can stand on their own are those who, thanks to an abundance of people or money, can raise a sufficient army and face any attacker in open battle. Those who cannot do this must always rely on others; when attacked, their only option is to retreat behind their walls and defend their city.
For the first case, we’ve already discussed what to do, and I’ll say more later. For the second case, there’s nothing to advise except that such princes should focus on fortifying their cities, and not worry about defending the countryside. Any prince who has properly fortified his city and governs his people as previously described (and as will be described later) will only be attacked with great caution. People are always reluctant to engage in enterprises that appear difficult, and attacking a well-fortified city whose ruler is not hated by the people is never an easy task.
The cities of Germany are a good example: they are extremely free, control little territory beyond their walls, and obey the Emperor only when they wish. They do not fear him or any other powerful neighbor. This is because they are so well fortified that every would-be attacker considers their conquest tedious and difficult. Each has proper moats and walls, plenty of artillery, and enough food, drink, and firewood stored to last a year. Moreover, to keep the common people well-fed (and without burdening the public), they maintain enough public work for the population for a year, in the industries that are the backbone and life of the city. They also value military exercises and have many regulations to support them.
A prince who has a well-fortified city and has not made himself hated cannot be attacked. If someone does attempt an attack, the attacker will leave in shame, because the world is so unpredictable that no army could remain idle and camped outside a city for a whole year. Someone might object that if the people have property outside the city and see it burned, they will lose patience and, under the strain of a long siege and their own self-interest, forget their prince. But I answer: a strong and spirited prince will always overcome these difficulties, giving his people hope that the suffering will not last, instilling fear of the enemy’s cruelty, and cleverly dealing with anyone who seems too bold.
Besides, an enemy will naturally burn and destroy the countryside soon after arriving, when people are still passionate and eager to defend. The prince should be even less afraid then, because once the initial passion cools and the damage is already done, there’s no remedy left. At that point, people are more likely to unite with their prince, feeling that he owes them, since their homes have been burned and their property destroyed for his defense. Human nature means people feel bound by the benefits they give as well as those they receive.
So, if you think about all this carefully, it’s not difficult for a prudent prince to keep up the spirits of his citizens during a siege, as long as they have enough to live on and to defend themselves.
Chapter XI
Ecclesiastical Principalities
We have only one more type of principality left to discuss: ecclesiastical principalities. All the difficulties are encountered before acquiring them, because they are obtained either by ability or by fortune, but once acquired, they are maintained without either. This is because they are upheld by ancient religious institutions, which are so powerful that they keep their rulers in power no matter how those rulers act or live. These princes alone have states but do not defend them, have subjects but do not govern them. Yet their states are not taken from them, even though they are undefended; their subjects do not concern themselves with being governed, nor do they think of or are able to break away from them. Only these principalities, therefore, are secure and happy.
But since these states are ruled by higher causes to which the human mind cannot attain, I will refrain from discussing them, because being raised up and sustained by God, it would be presumptuous and reckless for a man to try to examine them. Nevertheless, if someone asks me how it is that the Church has come to such temporal power and greatness—since before the time of Alexander VI the rulers of Italy, and not only those who were called rulers, but every baron and minor lord, considered the Church of little consequence in temporal matters, yet now even the King of France trembles before it, and it has been able to drive the French out of Italy and ruin the Venetians—although this is well known, I do not think it is superfluous to recall some part of it here.
Before Charles, King of France, crossed into Italy, this province was under the rule of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These rulers had two main concerns: first, that no foreigner should enter Italy with an army; second, that none of them should seize more territory. Those most to be watched were the Pope and the Venetians. To keep the Venetians in check required the alliance of all the others, as happened during the defense of Ferrara. To keep the Pope’s power in check, they used the Roman barons, who were divided into two factions, the Orsini and the Colonna. There was always cause for conflict between them, and since they kept arms at hand and were under the Pope’s gaze, they kept the papacy weak and unstable.
Although from time to time a spirited pope would arise, such as Sixtus, neither luck nor skill was ever enough to free him from these troubles. The shortness of the papal reign was the cause, for in the ten years that a pope might live, he could scarcely bring down one of the factions; and if, for the sake of argument, he had almost destroyed the Colonna, a new enemy would arise against the Orsini to revive them, and he would not have time to destroy them. This is why the Pope’s temporal power was little regarded in Italy.
Then came Alexander VI, who, more than any previous pope, showed how much a pope could achieve with money and with arms. Using the Duke Valentino (Cesare Borgia) and the opportunities created by the French invasion, he did all those things I have discussed above in describing the duke’s actions. And although his intention was not to make the Church great, but to make his son great, everything he did ended up increasing the Church’s power, which, after his death and the fall of the duke, inherited the results of his efforts.
Next, Pope Julius II came to power and found the Church strong, holding all of Romagna, with all the Roman barons destroyed and the old factions eliminated by Alexander’s blows. He also found the way open to accumulating money, a method not practiced before Alexander’s time. Julius not only followed these paths, but surpassed them. He planned to take Bologna, crush the Venetians, and drive the French from Italy. He succeeded in all these aims, earning even greater praise because he did everything for the Church’s benefit, not for private gain. He also kept the Orsini and Colonna factions in the state in which he found them. And although there were still some leaders who might cause trouble, two things have kept them quiet: first, the Church’s great power, which frightens them; second, the absence of cardinals among them, for cardinals are the source of conflict between the barons. The barons will never be quiet as long as they have cardinals, because the cardinals support their factions both in Rome and outside, and the barons are forced to defend them. Thus, from the ambition of the clergy arise the discord and turmoil among the barons.
So the reign of Pope Leo has found the papacy extremely powerful. It is hoped that, if his predecessors made it great through arms, Leo will make it even greater and more respected by his goodness and countless other virtues.
Chapter XII
The Different Types of Military Forces and Mercenary Soldiers
Having discussed in detail all the types of principalities I set out to consider, and having explored the reasons for their success or failure, showing the ways in which many have tried to acquire and maintain them, I now need to talk more generally about the means of offense and defense that may arise in any of the previously mentioned states.
We have already said that a prince must have solid foundations; otherwise, he will inevitably fall. The main foundations of all states—new, old, or mixed—are good laws and good arms. Since you cannot have good laws where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms, good laws must follow, I will leave aside the matter of laws and talk about military organization.
A prince’s military forces are either his own, mercenary, auxiliary, or mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary troops are useless and dangerous. If a prince bases his state on mercenary armies, he will never be stable or secure, because mercenaries are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, unfaithful, brave among friends but cowardly before enemies. They have no fear of God, no loyalty to men, and their ruin is only postponed until the moment of attack. In peacetime, you are robbed by them; in wartime, by your enemies.
The reason for this is that they have no other motivation to stay in the field except a little pay, which is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are happy to be your soldiers as long as you are not at war, but as soon as war comes, they either run away or desert.
I should not have to labor this point, because the ruin of Italy today is caused by nothing other than its reliance on mercenary armies over many years. These troops once seemed strong among themselves, but when a foreign army arrived, they showed their true colors. That is why King Charles of France found it easy to conquer Italy. Whoever said that our sins were the cause of our troubles was right, but it was not the sins they imagined, but the ones I have described. And because these were the sins of princes, the princes themselves have suffered the consequences.
Let me show more clearly the misery of relying on mercenaries.
Mercenary captains are either excellent or not. If they are, you cannot trust them, since they always seek their own greatness—either by oppressing you, their master, or by oppressing others against your wishes. If the captain is not virtuous, he will ruin you. If you argue that anyone with an army in hand will do the same, whether mercenary or not, I would reply that armies should be commanded either by the prince himself or by the state. The prince must personally take command; the state must appoint its own citizens. If the commander chosen is not up to the job, he should be replaced. If he is, he should be kept in line by laws so that he does not overstep. Experience shows that only princes and states with their own armies have made great progress, while mercenary armies bring only harm; and it is harder for a state with its own citizens under arms to fall under the sway of one of its commanders than for one with foreign armies.
Rome and Sparta remained armed and free for many centuries. The Swiss are the most armed and the most free people in the world.
For examples of ancient mercenary armies, consider the Carthaginians, who were nearly destroyed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war against Rome, even though Carthaginian citizens commanded them. The Thebans made Philip of Macedon their commander after the death of Epaminondas, and after his victory he took away their freedom. The Milanese, after Duke Filippo’s death, hired Francesco Sforza to fight against the Venetians; after defeating the enemy at Caravaggio, he joined with them to oppress the Milanese, his employers. Sforza’s father, while in the service of Queen Joanna of Naples, suddenly left her disarmed, forcing her to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon to avoid losing her kingdom.
If the Venetians and Florentines in the past expanded their power with these troops and were not overthrown by them, I answer that the Florentines were simply lucky. Of the capable captains they might have feared, some never won, some were opposed by rivals, and others turned their ambitions elsewhere. John Hawkwood never won, so his loyalty was never tested; but everyone would agree that had he won, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. Sforza always had the Bracceschi as rivals, keeping each other in check. Francesco Sforza directed his ambition toward Lombardy, Braccio against the Church and the Kingdom of Naples.
Let us look at some recent cases. The Florentines made Paolo Vitelli their captain, a man of great prudence and reputation, who rose from humble origins. If he had captured Pisa, no one can deny that the Florentines would have had to rely on him, and if he joined the enemy, there would have been no remedy; keeping him, they would have had to obey him.
The Venetians, if you look at their history, always succeeded when they made war with their own troops—gentlemen and commoners alike; but when they started fighting on land with mercenaries, they followed the customs of Italy. At first, when they owned little land and had a great reputation, they did not need to fear their captains; but as they expanded—under Carmagnola, for example—they realized their mistake. After beating the Duke of Milan under Carmagnola’s command, they found him slow in war, and feared they could not win more with him. But not wanting to dismiss him and lose what they had gained, they were forced, for their own security, to have him executed.
Since then, they have had for captains Bartolomeo of Bergamo, Roberto of San Severino, the Count of Pitigliano, and others—men who were more dangerous for their potential losses than their gains, as seen at Vailà, where in a single day they lost what it had taken them eight hundred years to build. These arms lead only to slow, weak gains and sudden, miraculous losses.
Because I have come to examples from Italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenary troops, I will discuss them more broadly, describing their origins and progress so they can be better corrected. You must understand that, as soon as the Empire was pushed out of Italy and the Pope gained more temporal reputation, Italy was divided into many states. Many cities rose up against their nobles, who had previously oppressed them with the Emperor’s support, and the Church supported the cities to gain more temporal power. In some places, the citizens became rulers themselves. Thus, with Italy largely under the control of the Church and some republics, and with priests and citizens unused to arms, they began to hire foreigners.
The first to give reputation to this kind of force was Alberigo of Como, a Romagnol. From his discipline came, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time ruled Italy. After them came all the others who have commanded Italian armies up to our day, and the result of their “virtue” is that Italy has been invaded by Charles, plundered by Louis, assaulted by Ferdinand, and disgraced by the Swiss.
Their system was, first, to enhance their own reputation by minimizing that of the infantry. They did this because, having no state of their own and living by their wits, a few infantry did not give them enough reputation and many could not be supported. So they relied on cavalry, where a manageable number could be supported and honored. It got to the point where, in an army of twenty thousand, there were not two thousand foot soldiers. They also devised every way to avoid fatigue and danger for themselves and their soldiers: they did not kill each other in battle, but captured and ransomed prisoners; they did not attack cities or camps by night; they did not dig trenches or fortify their camps; they did not campaign in winter. All these things were allowed by their military codes, invented to avoid hardship and danger, so that they have brought Italy to slavery and disgrace.
Chapter XIII
Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops
Auxiliary troops are another type of useless military force. These are when you call upon a powerful ally to help defend or fight for you with his own soldiers—as Pope Julius II did not long ago. After seeing the poor performance of his mercenary troops at the siege of Ferrara, he turned to auxiliaries and made an agreement with Ferdinand, King of Spain, to help him with his armies. These troops may be good and useful in themselves, but for the person who calls them, they are always dangerous: if you lose, you’re ruined; if you win, you become their prisoner.
There are plenty of examples of this in ancient history, but I do not want to stray from the recent example of Pope Julius II, which is still fresh. In his desire to take Ferrara, he put everything in the hands of a foreign power. But his luck intervened, preventing him from suffering the consequences of this bad decision: after his auxiliaries were defeated at Ravenna, the Swiss unexpectedly drove out the victors, so he did not become a prisoner of either his enemies or his allies, having prevailed with the arms of others, not his own.
The Florentines, being completely unarmed, brought ten thousand French troops to Pisa to besiege it. By this decision, they put themselves in more danger than in any other period of their troubles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to defend himself from his neighbors, brought ten thousand Turks into Greece. When the war was over, the Turks refused to leave, and that was the beginning of Greece’s slavery to the infidels.
So, whoever wants to ensure defeat should use auxiliary troops—they are more dangerous even than mercenaries. With auxiliaries, disaster comes all at once; they are united, loyal to another master. With mercenaries, it takes more time and opportunity for them to hurt you, because they are not a single body and are hired and paid by you, so even if a mercenary commander rises, he cannot immediately acquire enough authority to harm you. In short, the problem with mercenaries is their laziness; with auxiliaries, it’s their strength. A wise prince will always avoid these arms, relying on his own, and will rather lose with his own troops than win with those of another, judging any victory won with foreign arms to be no real victory at all.
I will never hesitate to mention Cesare Borgia and his actions. The Duke entered Romagna with auxiliary troops, bringing in all the French, and with their help, took Imola and Forlì. But when he realized these troops were not reliable, he switched to mercenaries, hiring the Orsini and Vitelli. Discovering these, too, were unreliable and dangerous, he eliminated them and turned to his own troops. The difference between these types of forces can easily be seen in the change in the Duke’s reputation: he was never truly respected until everyone saw that he commanded his own army.
I don’t want to leave out Italian and recent examples, but I must also mention Hiero of Syracuse, one of those I named earlier. When he was made commander of the Syracusan army, he quickly realized mercenary troops were useless, for their captains were just like the Italian mercenary leaders of today. Seeing he could neither keep nor dismiss them safely, he had them all cut to pieces and fought his wars with his own troops, not those of others.
I want to recall a passage from the Old Testament as well: When David offered to fight Goliath, Saul put his own armor on David to encourage him. But David, after putting it on, refused it, saying he could not use them and would face the enemy with his own sling and knife. In short, someone else’s armor either falls off you or weighs you down and constricts you.
Charles VII, father of King Louis XI, after freeing France from the English with his fortune and skill, recognized the necessity of having his own troops and set up the system of men-at-arms and infantry in his kingdom. Later, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began to hire Swiss troops. This error, followed by others, is the cause of the current dangers facing France. By giving the Swiss a reputation, he has weakened all his own troops, for he disbanded the infantry entirely, and his men-at-arms are now dependent on foreign arms, for, being used to fighting alongside the Swiss, they no longer believe they can win without them.
Thus, the French cannot stand against the Swiss, and without the Swiss, they are ineffective against others. The French armies have therefore been mixed—part mercenary, part native—which is better than purely mercenary or purely auxiliary troops, but much inferior to fully native forces. If France had preserved or expanded the system set up by Charles, it would be invincible. But people’s lack of foresight means that something may seem good at first, even though its hidden danger, like a slow fever, is only revealed later.
If a prince only recognizes problems as they arise, he is not truly wise, and few have this gift. If you look at the first cause of the fall of the Roman Empire, you will see it began when they started hiring the Goths as soldiers, for from that point, the strength of the Empire began to decline, and all the fighting ability that left the Romans was given to outsiders.
In conclusion, without native troops, no principality is secure: relying on fortune alone, with no strength of your own to defend you in adversity, is foolish. Wise men have always agreed that nothing is as weak and unstable as the reputation of power not founded on one’s own strength. Native troops are made up of your own subjects, citizens, or people you have raised yourself; all others are mercenary or auxiliary. The way to organize your own troops is easy to find if you study the systems I have mentioned, and consider how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized themselves; to those examples, I refer you completely.
Chapter XIV
What Belongs to a Prince Concerning the Military
A prince should have no other object, no other thought, and should take no profession as seriously as that of war and its rules and discipline. This is the only art expected of one who commands, and it is so powerful that it not only maintains those born princes, but often helps men of humble beginnings rise to that rank. On the other hand, whenever princes have focused more on pleasures than on arms, they have lost their states. The main reason for losing power is neglecting this art, and the reason for gaining it is to be skilled in it. Francesco Sforza became Duke of Milan from a private citizen because he was armed; his children, avoiding the hardship and discipline of arms, went from dukes back to being private citizens.
Among the many problems that come from being unarmed, it makes you despised—one of those disgraces a prince should avoid, as I’ll explain later. There is no comparison between an armed man and an unarmed man. Reason does not allow the armed to obey the unarmed willingly, nor can an unarmed prince be safe among armed servants. One resents, the other suspects, so they can never work well together. Therefore, a prince who does not understand military matters, in addition to other misfortunes, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor trust them.
He should never take his mind off this exercise of war, and in peacetime, he should practice it even more than in wartime. This can be done in two ways: through action and through the mind.
In action: Besides keeping his men well-organized and trained, a prince should always be out hunting, hardening his body to hardship and learning about the terrain—how hills rise, valleys open, plains stretch, and the nature of rivers and marshes. This is of great importance for two reasons: first, it helps him understand his own country better and defend it; second, through this knowledge and practice, he can easily understand similar terrain elsewhere, because the features of one region are much like those of another, so knowledge of one helps with others. A prince who lacks this expertise fails in the first requirement of a commander, for this skill teaches how to find the enemy, set up camp, lead armies, plan battles, and lay siege to towns to your advantage.
Filopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, was praised by writers for never thinking of anything but warfare, even in peacetime. When out with friends, he would often stop and discuss with them: “If the enemy were on that hill and we were here with our army, who would have the advantage? How could we approach them safely? If we wanted to retreat, how would we do it? If they retreated, how would we pursue them?” He would propose every possible scenario, ask their opinions, give his own, and support it with reasons—so that, when leading armies in war, nothing ever happened for which he had not already thought of a solution.
In the mind: A prince should read history, study the actions of great men, see how they conducted themselves in war, and examine the causes of their victories and defeats to avoid mistakes and imitate success. Above all, he should do as some excellent men have done: imitate those who were praised and glorious before him, keeping their actions always before his eyes. Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar imitated Alexander, and Scipio imitated Cyrus. Whoever reads Xenophon’s life of Cyrus will see, when reading Scipio’s life, how much glory Scipio earned from that imitation, and how, in chastity, kindness, humanity, and generosity, he matched what Xenophon wrote about Cyrus.
A wise prince should always observe these methods, never resting in peaceful times, but making the most of them through hard work, so that he is ready to use what he has learned in adversity, and when fortune changes, he is prepared to withstand its blows.